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Introduction
The Honorable Loren A. Snith*
The National Legal Center for the Public Interest asked me to write this
introduction to this symposium on regulatory takings. Why should I have been
asked? Maybe because they knew I would accept? Possibly. Or perhaps it
was because the court upon which I serve hears all money claims for just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment against the federal government?
Likely reason. Or perhaps because I have been associated with the Center in
the past as an author and speaker? That's it! I have reached that enviable end
of the intellectual line, the introduction writer, whose only task is to
recommend to you, the reader, to read the work. And even that isn't much
of a task since if you are reading the introduction you are probably already
interested in the main text. Thus I write to commend what you are already
doing! It sounds like work fit for a federal judge.
There may be a slightly more serious reason why a federal trial judge is,
at least symbolically, a good author of this introduction. It relates to the
difficult role of the judicial and legal system in the area of Fifth Amendment
takings jurisprudence. Before focusing on the judicial and legal problems,
however, it might be useful to define the property rights which are the focus
of this jurisprudence. James Madison did this as eloquently as has ever been
done in an essay in 1792. As the sun was beginning to rise upon our infant
republic, Madison wrote:
Property
This term in its particular application means "that dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
exclusion of every other individual."
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a
man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every one
else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or money is called
his property.
In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions and the free
communication of them.
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1966; J.D., Northwestern, 1969. Chief Judge, U.S. Court
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He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in
the profession and practice dictated by them.
He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his
person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free
choice of the objects on which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be
equally said to have a property in his rights.'
Madison's venerable role in our republic-author of much in the
Constitution and a large share of The Federalist; member of the First
Congress, where he was the driving force behind the Bill of Rights; and, of
course, our fourth President-should give much weight to his definition. But
we live in a so-called era of reason where faith and authority are questioned,
if not downright scorned. Madison's concept is, nonetheless, as consistent
with right reason as it is with the authority his words should bring to any
constitutional topic.
Reason leads us to accept Madison's definition on two grounds. First,
there is no principled line that can be drawn between liberty and property, or
for that matter the right to have people refrain from taking your life. Life,
liberty, and property define in a seamless way the fundamental integrity of the
human person. They are all aspects of the human being's right to be left alone
unless acted upon with consent. The second ground is the historical
background of Madison's definition. It must be understood in the context of
the Bill of Rights.
While Madison and the other Framers had a deep appreciation of the
necessity for government in a world of imperfect human beings, they clearly
understood the great paradox of government. "If men were angels, no
government would be necessary," observed Madison in The Federalist.2 But,
in our world, imperfect human beings would also be the governors. Indeed,
the sad lesson of the twentieth century from Hitler and Stalin to Pol Pot and
Saddam Hussein is that some of the most imperfect of human beings (to use
that phrase loosely) have been our rulers.
Thus, the very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the citizen
against the government, specifically the federal government. This calls for
construing the operative protections of the Bill of Rights broadly. It is a
remedial provision in the most profound sense. And for the most part the
courts have embraced this broad construction with respect to government
actions relating to speech, the press, invasion of privacy, procedural due
process, and various other areas. But in the last half-century this has not been
1. From an essay entitled "Property" published in the March 27, 1792, National Gazette, 12
JAMEs MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 201 (Hobson, et al. eds, 1979).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
[Vol. 46:525
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss4/2
INTRODUCTION
done with respect to government actions affecting what are termed "economic
interests." It is certainly not the purpose of this introduction (nor even the
possible task of this whole volume) to explore the reasons for the courts'
seeming insensitivity to economic liberty. Awareness of the problem may be
of some use, however, in understanding the topic this publication addresses.
It is also why I, as a judge, feel that this symposium-and other quality
scholarship and analysis, of all persuasions-is needed in this area.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." This
symposium focuses on so-called regulatory takings-that is, cases in which the
government is claimed to have taken property rights not by outright seizure or
occupation, but by regulation. It must be borne in mind, however, that many
questions of economic liberty are not questions of whether a Fifth Amendment
taking has occurred. In fact, under our Constitution and its federal system of
general state sovereignty, most economic liberty battles have little to do with
takings as classically understood. The reason takings jurisprudence is such a
challenge for the judiciary and the legal system, however, is that the other
protections for our economic liberty have vanished; thus, takings law has
become the only area where citizens can seek any redress from the legal
system for government intrusion. The protections of federalism and the
doctrine of enumerated powers, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the
Contract Clause and the nondelegation doctrine, and the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses-all have been abandoned by the courts as real or
viable limitations on government actions affecting economic relationships.
Only the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause retains any life.
This puts an enormous strain on takings doctrine and the courts. The
cases are asked to do the work the Framers assigned to all three branches, and
perhaps most importantly to the states and their tripartite governments. It
confronts judges-particularly, I might add, trial judges-with drawing lines
that should for the best result be drawn with a much broader societal
consensus. It also undercuts the function courts do best, which is applying
relatively fact-oriented, general but comprehensive rules to specific facts. In
current takings jurisprudence, judges are instead given only the Fifth
Amendment's very short, very general text and a confusing array of ever
varying precedent with which to work. But, for good or ill, this task has
devolved on the courts, and they must do their job to make the Fifth
Amendment's takings guarantee as real as other constitutional protections we
hold so dear.
Regulatory takings raise a variety of legal, economic, and political issues.
(By "political," incidentally, I do not mean Left-Right, Democrat-Republican,
but political in the Madisonian sense of competing "factions"3 and in the
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modem sense of "public choice.") The four chapters which follow cover each
of these aspects of the problem. And while the four authors write from
different perspectives, all conclude that more needs to be done to protect
private property.
The first chapter, "Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause," begins
by discussing the text of the Takings Clause and its historical origins. It then
analyzes how the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court compares
with that text, and suggests how departures from it might be corrected. In
particular, the chapter concludes that, while much of the Court's jurisprudence
is inconsistent with the Framers' meaning, there are at least elements in the
three-part analysis that the Court has frequently employed that have, or could
be given, textual roots. By returning to the text, not only would its original
meaning be honored, but the Clause would operate less as a device for judges
to impose their policy preferences and more as an actual rule of law. The
author of chapter 1 is Roger Clegg, who is vice president and general counsel
of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, this symposium's
publisher. Mr. Clegg also served as the number-two official in the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice; while
there, he worked on many takings issues for the federal government, including
an amicus brief in the Supreme Court on behalf of David Lucas in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.4
A legal issue of particular importance, and that has been especially
neglected, is how to calculate "just compensation" once it is determined that
a taking has occurred. This issue is the focus of the book's second chapter,
"Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform." Professor Michael
E. DeBow of the Cumberland School of Law at Samford University-who has
been trained in both law and economics-argues that current judicial doctrine
systematically undercompensates property owners for the property taken from
them. He then offers a "public choice" explanation for why legislatures have
failed to redress this inequity, and suggests a possible reform strategy.
Professor DeBow's chapter not only finishes up the more narrowly legal
analysis begun in chapter 1, but also sets the stage for the further economic
and political analysis in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Professor Jerry Ellig
of George Mason University's Center for the Study of Market Processes gives
an economist's perspective on the importance of property rights in chapter 3,
"The Economics of Regulatory Takings." Nancie Marzulla-who is president
and chief legal officer of Defenders of Property Rights, the nation's only legal
defense foundation devoted exclusively to the protection of private property
rights-has contributed the symposium's concluding chapter, "State Private
Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to 'Environmental Takings."' As its
title suggests, the chapter concentrates on the very significant developments in
4. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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this area that are occurring in the state legislatures, but before doing so Ms.
Marzulla explains why the statehouses have become the battleground-by
talking about the successes, failures, and frustrations of property owners in the
courts and before the U.S. Congress.
The writing and analysis in this volume will be a significant and important
contribution to the understanding of takings jurisprudence. It is my hope that
other voices, with different perspectives, and from all sides, will join in
focusing on this topic. After all, it is the fundamental and permanent issue
that any free society faces. I commend the National Legal Center for the
Public Interest, editor and author Roger Clegg who worked so hard on this
symposium (and so persistently to extract my small piece from my out box),
and the other fine authors of this volume.
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